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Sapontzis: Commentary 
of that contract. For example, many parents sign 
contracts with day care centers to watch over and tend 
to their children. So, is it so ''natural'' to believe that, 
with only marginal exceptions, only those who 
subscribe to a contract containing principles of justice 
are to beuefitfrom the guarantees of justice? Even 
though nonhuman animals cannot be parties to a 
contract, it does not follow that they could not be 
intended beneficiaries of that contract. Consequently, 
if the participants in the original position can be 
incarnated as any of the intended beneficiaries of the 
contract they devise-a contract designed to overcome 
the distributive shortcomings of utilitarianism-they 
could be incarnated as nonhuman animals. 
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Replly: 
Rawls: Rejecting 
Utilitarianism Bind Animals 
Lilly-Marlene Russow 
As is his custom, Professor Saponztis begins his 
reply with a masterful reconstruction of my basic 
argument, the better to pinpoint the exact nature of our 
disagreement. His reconstrucltion is entirely accurate 
and fulfills its function admirably. It allows us to focus 
directly on the key issue: the proper interpretation of 
and justification for Premise C: "Individuality, in the 
morally significant sense, involves [for Rawls] having 
and caring about a life-plan." 
In my paper, I argued that this premise could be 
justified by Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism and that 
it, in turn, justified excluding most nonhuman animals 
from the original position. Sapontziscontends, in 
contrast, that Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism is too 
weak to support Premise C. He thinks that Rawls rejects 
utilitarianism primarily because it lacks a fait principle 
ofdistribution and argues that a demand for justice and 
fair distribution does not yield any conclusions about 
the relevance or importance of life-plans. He concludes 
that Rawls's exclusion of animals springs from his 
contractarian bent rather than from his rejection of 
utilitarianism. If this is correct, Rawls's position is much 
less interesting and plausible:: mariy arguments (most 
notably, "marginal case" sorts of arguments) discredit 
generally contractarian approaches from the outset, 
while critiques of utilitarianism are more likely to 
demand serious and sustained attention. 
Sapontzis is correct in claiming that Rawls is 
concerned about utilitarianism's apparent willing-
ness to countenance unjust distributions; however, I 
think Rawls's objections go beyond that. Another, 
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more basic, element in his critique attacks utilitar-
ianism's attempt to make one characterization of "the 
good" apply to all-in Rawls's tetnls, its attempt to 
have a "thick" theory of the good prior to or as basic 
as a theory of right. That is the element that leads 
Rawls to see the ability to have and care about life-
plans as morally relevant. 
The argument is too complicated to deal with 
adequately here, but the basic idea is that Rawls 
rejects utilitarianism in part because he thinks an 
adequate moral theory must, in contrast to any sort 
of teleological theory, provide an account of right 
that is not dependent on a previously defined and 
general concept of' the good.' Part of his justification 
for this position is the assumption that different 
people will inevitably make different choices and that 
one cannot generalize from individual rational choice 
to rational choice for society.' This leads to the idea 
that the capacity to define a good of one's own, to 
choose and care about that good, is morally relevant. 
That, in turn, leads Rawls to his emphasis on life-
plans. The progress along this path is by no means 
inevitable; my point is that we must focus on this 
aspect of Rawls's argument, not his contractarianism, 
to evaluate his exclusion of animals. 
The same point can be put into a slightly different 
context. Rawls and Tom Regan agree that an individual 
subject-a moral person or a subject-of-a-life-has 
moral significance, but they disagree about what 
features of the subject make it morally relevant. Why 
should we respect individuals as distinct subjects, each 
on his/her/its own tetnls? Rawls and Regan answer this 
question differently, and we need to see how Rawls 
justifies his answer. I have been arguing that his answer 
is tied to his rejection of utilitarianism and its theory of 
the good, and his subsequent focus on the ability to 
fotnlulate, choose, and care about life plans. 
I would like to close on a different note. Sapontzis 
asks "under what conditions can a being who benefits 
from just treatment be denied the guarantees of 
justice?" If the ultimate topic is nonhuman animals, 
one must ask a prior question: "Can most nonhuman 
animals benefit from just treatment?" That, I submit, 
is an ambiguous question. Clearly, animals would 
benefit if goods were distributed more equitably 
("more justly" would beg tlle question against Rawls) 
than they are now. It is not at all obvious that an act's 
being just makes it better, otller tllings being equal, 
for a nonhuman animal; in tllat sense, just treatment-
as distinct from benevolent, generous, or sympathetic 
treatment-may not be a benefit to nonhuman animals. 
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Announcement 
The Culture and Animals Foundation and the 
Rutgers Animal Rights Law Clinic are pleased 
to announce the upcoming conference A NEW 
GENERATION FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, a 
national conference for college students and 
teachers. The conference will take place at 
the New Brunswick Campus of Rutgers 
University during the weekend of July 29 
through August 1, 1993. 
During the conference we will explore a 
diversity of issues, including establishing 
coalitions with other social justice movements; 
planning and undertaking acts of civil 
disobedience; resolving conflicts within the 
movement and beyond. Students and animal 
rights scholars will present work on history, 
philosophy, and other animal rights scholar-
ship. In addition, we will focus on activism, 
sharing success stories and ideas about what 
student can do on their campuses. 
We are seeking students who are interested in 
presenting original work in the field of animal 
rights, and are establishing a scholarship fund 
for those who would like to participate. If you 
are interested in presenting work or would 
like to receive infotnlation concerning the 
conference, please write: 
A New Generation for Animal Rights 
209 N. Graham Street 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516 
or call: (919) 942-6909 
or FAX: (919) 942-3875 
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